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COMMENT 
The Confidentiality of University Student Records: 
A Common Law Analysis 
College students are subject to continuous objective and 
subjective evaluations prior to and throughout their college ca- 
reers. The results of many of these evaluations eventually find 
their way into each student's "file." These evaluations can have 
a significant impact on the student. Selection of fellowship and 
scholarship recipients, enrollment in special classes, admission to 
graduate school, and offers of employment are only a sampling of 
the opportunities that may be contingent upon the information 
maintained by the university in student files. Obviously the stu- 
dent, as well as the university, has a vital interest in ensuring that 
the information is accurate and is disclosed only to appropriate 
persons. 
The interests of the student and the university with respect 
to the confidentiality of, or student access to, the records main- 
tained in the student file often conflict. The student may want 
access to his file for several reasons, one of which is to obtain 
feedback pertaining to his past performance and to correct any 
prejudicial inaccuracies contained in the file. He may also want 
to control access to his file by prospective employers, parents, and 
others whose knowledge of unfavorable reports in the file may be 
against his interests. In contrast, the university is limited by 
adminstrative constraints in providing access to students and has 
an interest in maintaining the usefulness of certain items by con- 
trolling access. For example, the university has an interest in 
denying student access to letters of recommendation since such 
letters would tend to be less candid-therefore less meaning- 
ful-if the authors could not be guaranteed confidentiality. Fur- 
ther, the university may wish to provide access to the records to 
certain persons-professors, counselors, and prospective employ- 
ers-against the student's wishes. These student-university con- 
flicts are often significant enough to warrant judicial or statutory 
resolution. 
Although the number of student-university disputes over the 
confidentiality of student records is increasing, few reported cases 
directly treat this issue. Twenty years ago, an analysis of this 
subject would have been largely theoretical. Since that time, a 
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shift in attitudes toward recognizing student rights, the increased 
availability of legal services, and important technological ad- 
vances in the ability to record, store, and facilitate access to vast 
quantities of data have focused national interest on the issue of 
student records confidentiality. 
Recent federal legislation, known as the Buckley amend- 
ment, conditions certain federal funding upon school compliance 
with the student records confidentiality guidelines set forth in the 
statute.' The Buckley amendment basically provides that a stu- 
dent be given access to his own educational records and that 
1. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974,20 U.S.C. 8 12328 (Supp. IV, 
1974) [hereinafter cited as Buckley amendment]. The Buckley amendment, a part of the 
Education Amendments of 1974, became effective November 19, 1974 and was later 
amended by S.J. RES. 40, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). An in-depth analysis of the Act is 
provided by Note, Federal Genesis of Comprehensive Protection of Student Educational 
Record Rights: The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 61 IOWA L. REV. 
74 (1975). For its legislative history see Comment, The Buckley Amendment: Opening 
School Files For Student and Parental Review, 24 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 588, 594-99 (1975); 
Comment, Protecting the Privacy of School Children and Their Families Through the 
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 14 J .  FAMILY L. 255, 270-76 (1975). 
The statute applies only to educational institutions, public or private, receiving fed- 
eral funds under programs sponsored by the Commissioner of Education. 20 U.S.C. § 
1232g(a)(3) (Supp. IV, 1974). A student is defined as "any person with respect to whom 
an educational agency or institution maintains education records or personally identifi- 
able information, but does not include a person who has not been in attendance at such 
agency or institution." 20 U.S.C. # 1232g(a)(6) (Supp. IV, 1974). The only sanction for 
noncompliance is withholding of funds from the offending institution. 
The statute provides a student the right of access to his student records within 45 
days of a request. The student also has a right to a hearing to challenge the content of his 
records. A student may not, however, view the following materials: 
a. the financial records of a student's parents; 
b. confidential letters of recommendation entered into the record prior to the 
effective date of the statute; 
c. confidential letters of recommendation entered into the record subsequent 
to the effective date of the statute where the student has waived his right to see 
them; 
d. records made by professionals, e.g., physicians and psychiatrists, while act- 
ing in their professional duties; 
e. records in the sole possession of the maker that are not otherwise accessible 
to other parties. 
Without the student's written consent, the educational institution cannot release a 
student's personal records, except for "directory information" (name, address, major, 
telephone listing, etc.) to third parties other than (a) other university officials with a valid 
interest; (b) officials of educational institutions where the student is applying for admis- 
sion; (c) accrediting organizations; (d) any party presenting a valid court subpoena; (e) 
certain government officials; and (f) parents of a dependent student. 20 U.S.C. § 
1232g(b)(l), (b)(2) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
The institution must keep a record of parties who request access to specific student 
records and must publish their records policy in such a way as to give sufficient notice to 
the student. 20 U.S.C. 9 1232g(b)(4)(A) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
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public access to a student's educational records be denied absent 
the student's permission.* The Buckley amendment leaves unre- 
solved, however, numerous issues likely to arise in future student- 
university litigation? Neither the causes of action available to the 
student nor the defenses available to the university are defined 
by the statute. The propriety of various remedies, such as com- 
pensatory and punitive damages, injunctions, and mandamus, 
remains unanswered. Further, the Buckley amendment does not 
affect schools that receive no funds under the specified federal 
program~.~ 
The case law concerning student records confidentiality is 
similarly undefined. The few courts that have resolved such dis- 
putes have generally either relied upon state statutes5 or have 
summarily disposed of the issue without articulating a legal 
basis .6 
Since the statutory and case law of student records confiden- 
tiality is unsettled, a careful review of analogous common law 
doctrines will be helpful. Although judicial precedents directly on 
point are scant, the common law provides useful tools by which 
questions of student records confidentiality can be analyzed and 
resolved. The most important of these are the tort right to pri- 
vacy, the "right to know," as defined by the law of public records 
disclosure, and the law of contracts. An orderly judicial develop- 
ment of these common law doctrines would better serve the re- 
2. Buckley amendment, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(l)(A), (b)(l) (Supp. IVY 1974). 
3. Although the Buckley amendment applies to elementary, secondary, and univer- 
sity level institutions, no attempt is made in this comment to deal with the record keeping 
policies of all. Rather, it will focus on the problems of record confidentiality in the univer- 
sity setting, and the application of the common law in that same context. 
4. The federal funds that are conditioned upon compliance with the terms of the 
Buckley amendment are those received under any program administered by the Commis- 
sioner of Education. 40 Fed. Reg. 1210 (1975). 
5. See, e.g., Valentine v. Independent School Dist., 187 Iowa 555,174 N.W. 334 (1919) 
(a state law establishing graded schools required finding that student's grades were public 
property, not the private property of teacher or superintendent); Wagner v. Redmond, 127 
So. 2d 275, 277 (La. Ct. App. 1960) (en banc) (despite local school board rule, state law 
required superintendent to provide certain student names and addresses to member of 
board). 
6. See, e.g., Brown v. Knowlton, 370 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd without 
opinion, 505 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1974) (West Point cadet); Hagopian v. Knowlton, 346 F. 
Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 470 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1972) (West Point cadet); Wasson v. 
Trowbridge, 269 F. Supp. 900 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967) (Merchant 
Marine cadet). In each case the court summarily denied plaintiffs request to view his 
school records. Cf. Doe v. McMillan, 459 F.2d 1304 (D.C. Cir.'1972), reu'd, 412 U.S. 306 
(1973) (official immunity and constitutional protection of congressional speech and debate 
precluded suit). 
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spective interests of the student and the university than would 
burdensome legislative regulation. The purpose of this comment 
is to assist in that development. 
Prior to 1890, no English or American court had granted 
relief for an invasion of the "right to privacy."' In that year, the 
seminal article by Warren and Brandeis articulated for the first 
time the existence of a common law "right to privacy," the inva- 
sion of which was an actionable tort? Since that time, the right 
to privacy has been invoked in a number of factual  setting^.^ 
7. Although several distinct concepts are encompassed under the rubric of privacy, 
only two major meanings are involved in the context of university recordkeeping. The first 
is the "right of selective disclosure," which is the "claim of individuals, groups, or institu- 
tions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them 
is communicated to others." A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967). The second is a 
broader principle, well-defined by Judge Cooley's phrase, "the right to be let alone." T. 
COOLEY, TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888). This right is the "right of personal autonomy" and is 
concerned with allowing individuals the freedom to decide for themselves whether to 
engage in certain acts or experiences. See Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 
34,37-38 (1967). Confusion of these two principles arises since the same act can simultane- 
ously involve both aspects of privacy. For example, a woman seeking an abortion may wish 
neither to disclose that fact to the public nor be restricted by the law in making her 
decision. In the discussion on the confidentiality of student records, the primary focus is 
on the selective disclosure right. But if student records contain sensitive information 
regarding such intimate matters as abortion, other matters of moral decision, or psychol- 
ogical reports, then the concept of personal autonomy would also become a relevant 
consideration in evaluating a university's recordkeeping policies. 
8. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). The authors 
argued for the explicit recognition of a personal right to privacy, claiming that the right 
had been protected throughout the development of the common law under various legal 
theories, but had never been recognized as a distinct, legally protected interest. 
The article was written after an intrusion by the press into a private party given by 
one of Boston's social elite, Mr. Warren himself. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 
(1960). Consequently, it focused upon undue publicity as a breach of privacy. Id. at  389, 
392. Privacy was nevertheless defined in broad terms-the authors provided substantial 
growing room for the varied application of the new tort they had categorized. Since this 
influential article, a large body of private civil law, both common law and statutory, has 
developed. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK F THE LAW OF TORTS 4 117 (4th ed. 
1971). 
9. See generally Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960). Dean Prosser suggests 
that the law of privacy has developed in a haphazard manner, sacrificing internal coher- 
ency for expediency. He identifies four different interests that are protected by the law of 
privacy: (1) intrusion upon plaintiffs seclusion, or into his private affairs; (2) public 
disclosure of embarrassing private facts about plaintiff; (3) publicity that places plaintiff 
in a false light in the public eye; and (4) appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of 
the plaintiffs name or likeness. Id. a t  389. See also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK FTHE LAW 
OF TORTS § 117 (4th ed. 1971). Prosser's analysis has been criticized as obscuring the 
deeper interests-the intrinsic values of human dignity-that should be, or are in fact, 
protected by the law of privacy. See Bloustein, Privacy As An Aspect of Human Dignity: 
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Those cases dealing with the public disclosure of private facts 
suggest four elements that are indispensable to a cause of action: lo  
(1) the information must be private; (2) the information must 
have been disclosed to the public; (3) the information disclosed 
must identify the injured party; and (4) the disclosure must be 
offensive to reasonable sensibilities. 
A. The Information Must Be Private1' 
Although the range of information kept in student files varies 
widely among universities, a typical student file contains three 
broad categories of information: 
(1) Information requested from and furnished by the stu- 
dent, including biographical data, letters of inquiry written by 
the student to the university, signed statements of intended com- 
pliance with university policies, and personal financial data. 
(2) Information generated by the university concerning the 
student, including transcripts and grade reports, current class 
status, special placement or other test results, and teacher recom- 
mendations or evaluations. 
(3) Information received by the university from third par- 
ties, including high school or former college transcripts, national 
testing results, and letters of recommendation. 
Not all of this information, in fact relatively little of that 
provided by the student himself, would qualify as private under 
common law precedent. The cases indicate that "private infor- 
mation" is that which an individual himself would not divulge to 
the public.12 "Manifestly an individual cannot claim a right to 
An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y .U.L. REV. 962, 1000-1007 (1964). Despite Bloustein's 
criticism, Presser's classifications provide a helpful structural framework for analyzing 
privacy interests in the area of student records confidentiality. 
10. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF %E LAW OF TORTS 5 117 (4th ed. 1971). 
11. The terms "private" and "public" have been used to convey a number of mean- 
ings. The term "private," as it is here used, refers to the nature of the information itsklf 
rather than the nature of the records upon which the information is kept. In subsequent 
parts of this comment, reference is made to public records. The term "public records" 
refers to records required to be kept by law and should not be confused with public 
information (information that is not private). Indeed, public records, as well as nonpublic 
records, can contain protected private information. 
12. The effect of a person's release of information has, in the past, been to prevent 
his further control. 
Once an individual has given up information about himself . . . the presump- 
tion has been that he could not exert any control over i t  and had little legal 
recourse in the absence of extremely abusive disclosure of information files. Now 
with several recently enacted laws . . . this presumption has been overthrown. 
Symms & Hawks, The Threads of Privacy: The Judicial Evolution of a "Right of Privacy" 
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privacy with regard to that which cannot, from the very nature 
of things and by operation of law, remain private."I3 Applying 
this rule, courts have refused to classify information regarding 
birth or marriage, %ome address, '"military service, '%nd public 
occupation as private.I7 A university presumably would not incur 
liability for the public release of similar kinds of informationl"a 
student's name, date or place of birth, year in school, major field 
of study, class schedule, address, and awards received-since 
such information generally is not considered private. On the other 
hand, grade reports, transcripts, psychological testing results, 
and similar evaluative information have been held to satisfy the 
privacy requirement on grounds of public policylg or statutory 
p r ~ h i b i t i o n . ~ ~  
B. The  Information Must Have Been Disclosed to the Public 
The extent of publication, the sensitivity of the information 
disseminated, and the types of persons to whom the information 
and Current Legislative Trends, 11 IDAHO L. REV. 11, 21 (1974). See also Hoglund & 
Kahan, Invasion of Privacy and the Freedom of Information Act: Getman v. NLRB, 40 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527, 529-31 (1972); Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 
567, 255 N.E.2d 765, 769, 307 N.Y .S.2d 647, 652 (1970). 
13. Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304,311,95 P.2d 491,495 (1939) 
(newspaper's publication of spouse's suicide was not an invasion of privacy since investi- 
gation of suicide was required by statute). 
14. Werner v. Times-Mirror Co., 193 Cal. App. 2d 111, 14 Cal. Rptr. 208 (Dist. Ct. 
App. 1961); Meetze v. Associated Press, 203 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1956). 
15. McNutt v. New Mexico State Tribune Co., 88 N.M. 162,538 P.2d 804 (Ct. App.), 
cert. denied, 88 N.M. 318, 540 P.2d 248 (1975). 
16. Stryker v. Republic Pictures Corp., 108 Cal. App. 2d 191, 238 P.2d 670 (Dist. Ct. 
App. 1951); Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind. App. 643, 86 N.E.2d 306 (1949) (en 
banc) . 
17. Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind. App. 643, 86 N.E.2d 306 (1949) (en 
banc); Reed v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 21 So. 2d 895 (La. Ct. App. 1945). 
18. The Buckley amendment specifically exempts "directory information" from the 
category of student information protected by the statute, including: 
[Tlhe student's name, address, telephone listing, date and place of birth, 
major field of study, participation in officially recognized activities and sports, 
weight and height of members of athletic teams, dates of attendance, degrees 
and awards received, and the most recent previous educational agency or insti- 
tution attended by the student. 
20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(5)(A) (Supp. N, 1974). Provision is made, however, for a student to 
excise this material from public directories if he so desires. 20 U.S.C. 9 1232g(a)(5)(B) 
(Supp. IV, 1974). 
19. People v. Russel, 214 Cal. App. 2d 445,452, 29 Cal. Rptr. 562, 567 (Dist. Ct. App. 
1963). 
20. The Buckley amendment protects "education records," which are defined as 
"those records, files, documents, and other materials which-(i) contain information di- 
rectly related to a student; and (ii) are maintained by an educational agency or institution 
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is made available must be considered to determine whether there 
has been sufficient public disclosure of a student's records. Al- 
though university records policy allowing general publication of 
a student's private records may violate the student's right to 
privacy, there is question whether disclosure of those records to 
only one or even several unauthorized persons is sufficient to 
constitute "public disclosure." In a 1962 decision involving de- 
monstrative publication by a creditor of information concerning 
a debtor's alleged nonpayment, the United States Court of Ap- 
peals for the Fifth Circuit stated that absent physical intrusion, 
the tort of invasion of privacy must be accompanied by publicity 
to a "large number of persons as distinguished from one individ- 
ual or a few."21 
On the other hand, some cases suggest that certain informa- 
tion, although part of a public record, must nonetheless be kept 
confidential and free from any unauthorized public i n ~ p e c t i o n . ~ ~  
Especially if the privacy interests of the plaintiff are unusually 
high, for example, where the records treat matters of morality, 
discipline, or psychological evaluation, courts have taken a more 
critical view of records disclosure. The courts in these cases have 
suggested that the importance or sensitivity of the information 
disclosed may be a decisive factor in determining whether such 
disclosure is actually considered a "public d isc l~sure ."~~ 
or by a person acting for such agency or institution." 20 U.S.C. 5 1232g(a)(4)(A) (Supp. 
IV, 1974). 
21. Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9,11 (5th Cir. 1962) (tires 
were removed from plaintiffs automobile and it was left standing on its rims a t  country 
club where plaintiffs fellow employees, employer, and country club members viewed this 
embarrassment to plaintiff recovery allowed). Compare Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 53 
Cal. App. 2d 207, 127 P.2d 577 (Dist. Ct. App. 1942) (letters distributed to 1,000 persons 
were sufficient publication for invasion of privacy) and Montgomery Ward v. Larragoite, 
81 N.M. 383, 467 P.2d 399 (1970) (publication of debt to three relatives was invasion of 
privacy) with Gregory v. Bryan-Hunt Co., 295 Ky. 345, 174 S.W.2d 510 (1943) (oral 
publication in restaurant with "several persons" present was no invasion); Hendry v. 
Conner, 226 N.W.2d 921 (Minn. 1975) (oral publication to a "very small number of 
persons" in hospital waiting room was no invasion); French v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 247 
Ore. 554, 430 P.2d 1021 (1967) (disclosure to son and daughter-in-law was not sufficient); 
and Vogel v. W.T. Grant Co., 458 Pa. 124, 327 A.2d 133 (1974) (notification to one 
employer and three relatives was not sufficient publication). 
22. See, e.g., Mathews v. Pyle, 75 Ariz. 76, 251 P.2d 893 (1952); Patterson v. Tribune 
Co., 146 So. 2d 623 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962), cert. denied, 153 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1963); State 
ex rel. Cummer v. Pace, 121 Fla. 871, 164 So. 723 (1935); MacEwan v. Holm, 226 Ore. 27, 
359 P.2d 413 (1961). 
23. See, e.g., Runyon v. Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, 26 Cal. App. 2d 183, 79 
P.2d 101 (Dist. Ct. App. 1938); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Trustees, 
178 Mich. 193, 144 N.W. 538 (1913); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. State, 282 Minn. 
86, 163 N.W.2d 46 (1968). 
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Whether private student records are of a sensitive nature 
sufficient to satisfy the public disclosure element is a question 
that has not been fully resolved. A California appellate court 
announced in 1963 that limited disclosure of private student re- 
cords to even one unauthorized person was against public policy 
and that the negligent release of a student's transcript to an 
unauthorized third party "might well subject the school to suit 
. . . for a violation of [the student's] right of privacy."24 The 
court held that a fraudulent request by an unauthorized party for 
a student's transcript was criminal fraud, which "injures the 
public because i t  has been determined that the best interests 
of society are served by not opening to the general public the 
grades received by  individual^."^^ This language suggests that 
disclosure of private student records to even one unauthorized 
person can be sufficient to satisfy the public disclosure element 
of a tortious invasion of privacy. 
Certain third parties, however, are not considered part of this 
public. Disclosure of private student records to these parties does 
not result in liability for invasion of privacy.26 Important among 
these exceptions are courts of law issuing subpoenas for student 
records, since the right of privacy exists only so far as its assertion 
is consistent with law or public policy, and university personnel, 
who presumably have a right of access to student records for 
educational or other valid purposes of the uni~ersity.~'  Absent 
such valid purposes, however, university personnel should have 
no greater access to a student's records than any other member 
of the public. The right of access may also extend to "institutions 
of learning" to which the student is applying for admission. In 
1969, a federal district court held: 
School officials have a right and, we think, the duty to record 
and communicate true factual information about their students 
to institutions of learning, for the purposes of giving to the latter 
24. People v. Russel, 214 Cal. App. 2d 445,452, 29 Cal. Rptr. 562, 567 (Dist. Ct. App. 
1963). 
25. Id. 
26. The Buckley amendment makes provision for the release of student records, 
without consent, to the following parties: (a) university officials with a valid interest; (b) 
officials of educational institutions where the student is applying for admission; (c) certain 
government officials; (d) accrediting organizations; (e) any party pursuant to presentation 
of a valid court order. 20 U.S.C. 06  1232g(b)(l)(A)-(I), (b)(2)(B) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
27. See generally Caruso, Privacy of Students and Confidentiality of Student 
Records, 22 CASE W .  RES. L. REV. 379 (1971). See also Growick v. Board of Ed., 39 App. 
Div. 2d 785, 331 N.Y.S.2d 906 (3d Dep't 1972) (school principal required to  furnish confi- 
dential student records for pretrial examination). 
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an accurate and complete picture of the applicants for admis- 
sion .2x 
Thus, certain information can be disclosed to authorized persons 
for valid purposes without being considered "disclosed to the 
public. " 
C. T h e  Information Disclosed Must  Identify the  Injured Party 
The public disclosure of private information from a student 
file is not an invasion of the student's right to privacy unless it 
identifies the student.2g Thus, the release of anonymous student 
data or statistics to institutions or to individuals for research 
purposes is appropriate." A university should not assume, how- 
ever, that merely blotting out a student's name will be sufficient 
to prevent identification. In Cason v. the Supreme 
Court of Florida held that an author who had commented in his 
book about the coarse speech and brusque manner of the plain- 
tiff, naming her only by her first name, had nonetheless made her 
recognizable to her friends, and was therefore liable for invading 
her privacy. Similarly, the release of student records that include 
the student's photograph, social security number, address, stu- 
dent number, or any other information that identifies the student 
could constitute an invasion of privacy by a university. 
28. Einhorn v. Maus, 300 F. Supp. 1169, 1171 (E.D. Pa. 1969). Some high school 
students had participated in the distribution of literature and had worn black armbands 
to the graduation service as a means of protest. Plaintiff students sought to enjoin the 
school from noting these activities on the school records and communicating them to 
institutions of higher learning. The injunction was not granted since the petitioners failed 
to show immediate or irreparable harm and the communication was true. 
29. Cf. Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co., 129 F. Supp. 817 (D.D.C. 1955), aff'd, 
232 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 945 (1956) (televising life story of criminal 
12 years after a pardon, where person was not named and honest effort to avoid possible 
identification was made, did not constitute an invasion of right to privacy); Raynor v. 
American Broadcasting Co., 222 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Pa. 1963). 
30. The Buckley amendment allows student records to be used for audit, evaluation, 
or enforcement of federally supported educational programs provided the data are col- 
lected in a manner that will not allow personal identification of the students. 20 U.S.C. 
l232g(b) (3) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
31. 155 Fla. 108, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944). See also Nappier v. Jefferson Standard Life 
Ins. Co., 322 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1963) (television broadcast which sufficiently identified 
rape victims, although not mentioning them by name, invaded their right to privacy); 
Carlisle v. Fawcett Publ. Inc., 201 Cal. App. 2d 733, 20 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962) 
(plaintiffs given name and general description sufficiently identified plaintiff to invade 
his privacy). 
? 
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D. The  Disclosure Must  Be Offensive to Reasonable 
Sensibilities 
The fourth element of a tortious invasion of privacy requires 
that the public disclosure of the private student information be 
offensive to reasonable ~ensibi l i t ies .~~ Although no case has de- 
fined what kinds of school information, if released, will satisfy 
this requirement, a New York state district court held in 1971 
that the act of a public school or its employees in divulging "infor- 
mation given to [the] school in confidence" by the pupil could 
constitute outrageous actionable The court did not, 
however, discuss the nature of the information disclosed. 
Obviously, situations may arise in which it would be conven- 
ient for the student-or even to his advantage-for a university 
to disclose certain information in his record. The common law 
right to privacy does not handcuff the university to a rigid rule 
of nondisclosure in such situations. Rather, it requires that the 
university use reasonable discretion to disclose only information 
not offensive to reasonable sensibilities. A university may, for 
instance, wish to publish the academic achievement of its honor 
students. Since reasonable sensibilities are not offended by recog- 
nition of praiseworthy achievement, such disclosure is permis- 
sible. 
The common law right to privacy protects a student's private 
32. In Samuel v. Curtis Publishing Co., 122 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Cal. 1954), plaintiff 
argued that his right to privacy had been invaded by defendant's publication of a photo- 
graph showing plaintiff attempting to dissuade a woman from jumping off a bridge. The 
court stated: 
An invasion of the right of privacy occurs not with the mere publication of 
a photograph, but occurs when a photograph is published where the publisher 
should have known that its publication would offend the sensibilities of a normal 
person, and whether there has been such an offensive invasion of privacy is to 
some extent a question of law. 
Id. a t  328 (citations omitted). See also Davis v. General Fin. & Thrift Corp., 80 Ga. App. 
708, 57 S.E.2d 225 (1950). There, defendant sent plaintiff a telegram which said, "Must 
have March payment immediately or legal action." The court held: 
[Tlhe right of privacy must be restricted to "ordinary sensibilities" and not to 
super sensitiveness . . . . There are some shocks, inconveniences and annoyan- 
cies [sic] which members of society in the nature of things must absorb without 
the right of redress. 
Id. a t  711, 57 S.E.2d a t  227 (citations omitted). 
33. Blair v. Union Free School Dist. No. 6, 67 Misc. 2d 248, 254, 324 N.Y.S.2d 222, 
228 (Suffolk County Dist. Ct. 1971); cf .  Elder v. Anderson, 205 Cal. App. 2d 326, 23 Cal. 
Rptr. 48 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962). 
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records from unauthorized disclosure. It does not, however, pro- 
vide the student with the equally important right to examine his 
own records and, if necessary, to correct any errors contained 
there. Such a right was fashioned by the New York courts from 
the common law doctrine of "the right to know."34 
The right to know doctrine was originally formulated in Eng- 
land to open public records to the perusal of the interested pub- 
lic." In 1912, the Court of Appeals of New York invoked the 
doctrine as authority for compelling a local water supply board 
to open its records to a plaintiff citizen.36 The court stated: 
We think i t  may safely be said that a t  common law, when not 
detrimental to the public interest, the right to inspect public 
records and public documents exists with all persons who have 
a sufficient interest in the subject-matter thereof to answer the 
requirements of the law governing that question.37 
In 1961, the right to know doctrine was extended to student 
records. In Johnson v. Board of E d u ~ a t i o n , ~ ~  a lower New York 
court issued a writ of mandamus compelling defendant school 
board to make the school records of plaintiffs minor daughter 
available to plaintiff for his inspection. Faced with similar facts, 
another New York court, in Van Allen u. M ~ C l e a r y , ~ ~  implied that 
upon reaching majority the student himself assumes the same 
rights of access that the Johnson case recognized in the parents 
of the minor student. The court stated: 
Although certain records of the kind here involved are privileged 
and confidential, such privilege merely prevents disclosure of 
the communication or record to third parties, i.e., to persons 
other than . . . the person making the record. The "client" or 
34. For a general review of the common law development in the area of student 
records see H. BUTLER, K. MORAN, & F. VANDERPOOL, LEGAL ASPECTS OF STUDENT RECORDS 
20-32 (1972); Carey, Students, Parents and the School Record Prison: A Legal Strategy 
for Preventing Abuse, 3 J.L. & EDUC. 365 (1974); Comment, Parental Right to Inspect 
School Records, 20 BUFF. L. REV. 255 (1970). 
35. See Ferry v. Williams, 41 N.J.L. 332, 334-36, 32 AM. R. 219, 220-22 (Sup. Ct. 
1879). The court reviewed English common law cases treating the confidentiality of public 
records. 
36. Egan v. Board of Water Supply, 205 N.Y. 147, 98 N.E. 467 (1912). 
37. Id. a t  154, 98 N.E. a t  469, quoting Clement v. Graham, 78 Vt. 290,315,63 A. 146, 
153 (1906). 
38. 31 Misc. 2d 810, 220 N.Y.S.2d 362 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1961). Defendant 
school board argued that (1) the records requested were confidential; (2) since the records 
were allegedly needed to assist in the preparation of a legal action, plaintiff could obtain 
them through the more accepted method of a subpoena duces tecum; and (3) the parents 
requesting the records were not a party in interest. 
39. 27 Misc. 2d 81, 211 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1961). 
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"patient" within the meaning of the provisions referred to is the 
child and, since the child is minor, and cannot exercise full legal 
discretion, [it is] the parent or guardian of the child. . . . I t  
should be noted, further, that the education interest of the pupil 
can best be served only by full cooperation between the school 
and the parents, based on a complete understanding of all avail- 
able information by the parent as well as the school.40 
As adopted by the New York courts, the right to know doc- 
trine provides the student in a public school with a common law 
right to examine his school records." Where it exists, however, the 
right is not without reasonable boundaries-it is not available 
where access would be "detrimental to the public i n t e r e ~ t . " ~ ~  For 
example, disclosure to the student of letters of recommendation 
written in confidence by third parties may discourage the candor 
that is necessary to make such letters useful in the university's 
admission process. Since the resulting loss in the value of these 
letters may be detrimental to the public interest, student access 
to them arguably should be disa110wed.~~ 
It is generally held that a contract arises between a student 
and a university when the student pays the requisite tuition and 
fees and'agrees, sometimes explicitly but more often implicitly, 
to conform to the school's standards of conduct and perform- 
a n ~ e . ~ "  In return, the school promises to provide a package of 
40. Id. a t  86-87, 211 N.Y.S.2d at  507-08 (citations omitted). The court continued: 
"[Albsent constitutional, legislative, or administrative permission or prohibition, a par- 
ent is entitled to inspect the records of his child maintained by the school authorities as 
required by law." Id. a t  93, 211 N.Y.S.2d at  514. 
41. As of yet, no case has extended the right to students a t  private schools. 
42. Clement v. Graham, 78 Vt. 290, 315, 63 A. 146, 153 (1906) (plaintiff was entitled 
to inspect state auditor's vouchers); accord, Egan v. Board of Water Supply, 205 N.Y. 147, 
154, 98 N.E. 467, 469 (1912). 
43. The original version of the Buckley amendment included an unqualified student 
right to examine any letters of recommendation in his student file. Strong objections from 
universities, however, resulted in subsequent legislation that limited this right by forbid- 
ding a student to view letters of recommendation submitted prior to January 1, 1975. See 
20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(l) (Supp. IV, 1974). The educators argued that without an assurance 
of confidentiality, the writers of letters of recommendation would be less objective, thus 
destroying the value to the university of that important input. See generally Comment, 
The Buckley Amendment: Opening School Files for Student and Parental Review, 24 
CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 588, 596-600 (1975) (discussion of revision). 
Under the present provisions of the Buckley amendment, a student may waive his 
right to view the confidential letters of recommendation added to his file after January 1, 
1975. 20 U.S.C. 8 1232g(a)(l)(C) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
44. John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924); University of 
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services to the student, including instruction and certification of 
attendance and performance. 
The application of contract law to the student-university re- 
lationship grew out of its recognition as an alternative to the in 
loco parentis do~trine. '~ Although recent recognition and creation 
of constitutional, common law, and statutory rights of students 
has narrowed the subject matter that can be controlled by con- 
tract, contract law still governs a sizable portion of the litigation 
involving student-university disputes, especially where the uni- 
versity is private." The courts have shown no hesitancy in enforc- 
Miami v. Militana, 184 So. 2d 701, 704 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Anthony v. Syracuse 
Univ., 244 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (4th Dep't 1928); Healy v. Larsson, 67 Misc. 2d 
374, 323 N.Y.S.2d 625 (Sup. Ct. Schenectady County 1971). 
45. Before 1960, the great majority of student challenges in state courts to the author- 
ity of educational institutions were decided in favor of the institutions. Common ration- 
ales upon which the courts based their holdings were that a student challenging a univer- 
sity's action is under a heavy burden to show that the action was not taken to safeguard 
ideals of "scholarship and moral atmosphere," Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 
487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (4th Dep't 1928), or that in the absence of a statute, a school board is 
free to make policy or to take action without interference from judicial supervision as long 
as its policies and actions were reasonable and nonarbitrary, Tanton v. McKenney, 226 
Mich. 245, 197 N.W. 510 (1924). 
Both of these rationales, as well as others used, were buttressed by the English 
common law doctrine of in loco parentis. See, e.g., John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 
510, 102 So. 637 (1924). Under this doctrine, the same dominion exercised over the child 
by the parent was granted to  the educator. Since responsibility to educate one's children 
rested upon the parent, the in loco parentis doctrine extended that responsibility, with 
its concomitant rights, to the teacher. As early as 1860, however, the English courts began 
to modify this doctrine. In Regina v. Hopley, 2 F. & F. 202,206, 175 Engl. Rep. 1024, 1026 
(Home Cir. 1860), the court held that a defendant school teacher had inflicted "excessive" 
punishment upon a student and was therefore liable for the injuries incurred by the 
student. 
In the United States, the doctrine was unequivocally applied to the private college 
campus in Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 379, 161 S.W. 204, 206 (1913): 
College authorities stand in loco parentis concerning the physical and moral 
welfare, and mental training of the pupils, and we are unable to see why to that 
end they may not make any rule or regulation for the government, or betterment 
of their pupils that a parent could for the same purpose. Whether the rules or 
regulations are wise, or their aims worthy, is a matter left solely to the discretion 
of the authorities, or parents as the case may be, and in the exercise of that 
discretion, the courts are not disposed to interfere, unless the rules and aims are 
unlawful, or against public policy. 
Since the Gott decision in 1913, however, the in loco parentis doctrine has all but been 
abandoned in public college cases, see Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 
150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961), and is now facing similar extinction in 
its application to cases involving private colleges, see Comment, Common Law Rights for 
Private Uniuersity Students: Beyond the State Action Principle, 84 YALE L.J. 120, 141-43 
(1974); Comment, Colleges and Universities: The Demise of In Loco Parentis, 6 LAND & 
WATER L. REV. 715 (1971). 
46. Contract law has been applied more often in disputes between students and 
private schools than in disputes between public schools and their students since many 
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ing both express and implied terms of student-university con- 
t r a c t ~ . ~ '  Consequently, an application of contract law can provide 
a useful tool for the resolution of student-university disputes over 
the confidentiality of student records. 
A. Express Contractual Terms 
The express terms of a student-university contract are typi- 
cally derived from the school's catalog or bulletin." Courts have 
also found contractual terms in less obvious sources, such as a 
registration card,4g an admission application form," a catalog 
~upplement,~ '  and even from oral statements of university person- 
nel .52 
In order to legally bind both the university and the student, 
however, the contractual terms must be mutually understood by 
the parties.J3 Thus, the prominence and location of an express 
term may determine whether it is construed as part of the 
student-university contract. The relative importance of a particu- 
lar matter to the parties determines the extent of prominence 
required. If the term applies to a minor matter, such as library 
policies, i t  will not be construed as part of the student-university 
contract unless the term's context clearly indicates that i t  was 
meant to be included. On the other hand, if a term concerns a 
matter that is important to the student, such as the payment of 
tuition and fees, a less obvious disclosure may be su f f i~ ien t .~~  
student-public school disputes can be resolved by application of statutory provisions, 
whereas state statutes do not often apply to private schools. For a discussion of state 
statutes dealing with student records confidentiality see H. BUTLER, K. MORAN, & F. 
VANDERPOOL, LEGAL ASPECTS OF STUDENT RECORDS 16-21 (1972). 
47. See cases cited note 44 supra. 
48. University of Miami v. Militana, 184 So. 2d 701, 704 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966). 
49. Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 244 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (4th Dep't 1928). 
50. Culver Military Academy v. Staley, 250 Ill. App. 531 (1928). 
51. Balogun v. Cornell Univ., 70 Misc. 2d 474, 333 N.Y.S.2d 838 (Sup. Ct. Madison 
County 1971). 
52. Healy v. Larsson, 67 Misc. 2d 374, 323 N.Y.S.2d 625 (Sup. Ct. Schenectady 
County 1971). 
53. See generally 1 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 9 152 (1963). Mutuality of 
obligation in the context of student-university contracts does not always require mutual 
promises by both parties as long as consideration is otherwise present. For example, the 
student's tuition payment may provide such consideration. 
54. See Drucker v. New York Univ., 59 Misc. 2d 789, 300 N.Y.S.2d 749 (App. T. 
1969). Plaintiff applied for admission to defendant university and made a $200 deposit; 
the university's letter of acceptance provided for refund pursuant to a student's with- 
drawal only in case of serious illness. When plaintiff resigned to attend another institution, 
the contract was held binding and plaintiff was not allowed to recover $910 of tuition and 
fees paid prior to resignation. 
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Since the confidentiality of his records is generally not of vital 
importance to the incoming student, prominent disclosure should 
be necessary to contractually bind the university and the student. 
Certainly, reasonably prominent disclosure in the university ca- 
talog, class schedule, and admission application form would be 
adequate .55 
Once the terms of an express student-university contract are 
discovered, they must be interpreted. Generally, orthodox rules 
of contract interpretation apply. But when ambiguities have ap- 
peared in student-university contracts, courts have departed 
from the traditional rule of construing ambiguous terms against 
the drafter of the contracts6 and have interpreted them in favor 
of the univer~ity.~' In Carr v. St. John's Univer~ i ty ,~~  for example, 
several students who had been dismissed from a private univer- 
sity for having witnessed or participated in a civil marriage 
brought an action against the university for reinstatement. The 
university defended on grounds of a university regulation which 
stated that, "in conformity with ideals of Christian education and 
conduct," the university reserved the right to dismiss a student 
a t  any time on whatever grounds the university judged advisable. 
The trial court held against the university on the ground that the 
regulation was too vague.5g The appellate court recognized the 
existence of a student-university contract providing that if the 
student complies with the conditions set by the university, he will 
be awarded a degree. Then, after stating that the university can- 
not arbitrarily expel or refuse a degree to a student, the court 
reversed, refusing to review the university's exercise of its discre- 
tion? 
55. See, e.g., cases cited notes 48, 50, 51 supra. 
56. See 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS $ 559 (1960). 
57. The question of interpretation often arises when a student challenges the univer- 
sity's conduct rules, which are usually written in either very general language or not 
written a t  all. Faced with the university's unilateral interpretation of its own rules, courts 
have deferred to the university's judgment, placing the burden on the student to prove 
that the university's interpretation was unreasonable or arbitrary. See, e.g., Dehaan v. 
Brandeis Univ., 150 F. Supp. 626 (D. Mass. 1957); Hood v. Tabor Academy, 296 Mass. 
509, 6 N.E.2d 818 (1937); Note, Contract Law and the Student-University Relationship, 
48 IND. L.J. 253, 255-60 (1972). 
58. 34 Misc. 2d 319, 231 N.Y.S.2d 403 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1962), rev'd, 17 App. 
Div. 2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410 (2d Dep't), aff'd mem., 12 N.Y .2d 802, 187 N.E.2d 18, 235 
N.Y.S.2d 834 (1962). 
59. 34 Misc. 2d 319, 231 N.Y.S.2d 403 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1962). 
60. 17 App. Div. 2d 632, 231 N.Y .S.2d 410 (2d Dep't), aff'd mem., 12 N.Y .2d 802, 
187 N.E.2d 18, 235 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1962). 
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B. Implied Contractual Terms  
Contracting parties often implicitly agree to matters not ex- 
press on the face of the written contract. If a court can ascertain 
the intent of the parties with respect to such implicit terms from 
the writing and any circumstances surrounding the agreement, i t  
will imply them as part of the contract." Absent an express state- 
ment of university policy, courts have not hesitated to imply such 
terms to the student-university contracta or to limit the contract 
to terms that were, or appeared to have been, mutually under- 
stood by the parties.63 
The interpretation of student-university contracts could be 
benefited by an analogy to the interpretation of commercial con- 
tracts. To ascertain implied terms in commercial contracts, 
courts often look beyond the written agreement to the context 
within which the contract was made-custom, trade usage, and 
other standard  practice^.^^ The governing standard, of course, is 
to reflect the supposed intent manifested by the parties when the 
contract was formed. Similarly, courts could interpret student- 
university contracts in light of standard practice. If universities 
sufficiently conform to a standard practice regarding the confi- 
dentiality of student records, courts may be persuaded that, al- 
though not express, the student and university implicitly agreed 
on a records policy. If this theory of contract interpretation is 
accepted in the student-university context, whatever develops as 
the "standard practice" will have a significant impact on all uni- 
versities not having an express contractual policy. Two important 
influences on the development of a standard university practice 
are the Buckley amendment and the Constitution. 
The Buckley amendment imposes standard student records 
requirements on schools that receive certain federal fundingF 
Once these requirements become widely implemented, their in- 
fluence on universities not covered by the Buckley amendment 
- - 
61. E.g. ,  Hudson Canal Co. v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 75 U S .  (8 Wall.) 276 (1868). 
62. John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924); Healy v. Larsson, 
67 Misc. 2d 374, 323 N.Y.S.2d 625 (Sup. Ct. Schenectady County 1971); Barker v. Bryn 
Mawr College Trustees, 1 Pa. D. & C. 383 (Dist. Ct. 1922). 
63. Cf. Healy v. Larsson, 67 Misc. 2d 374, 323 N.Y.S.2d 625 (Sup. Ct. Schenectady 
County 1971); Drucker v. New York Univ., 59 Misc. 2d 789, 300 N.Y.S.2d 749 (App. T. 
1969). 
64. See, e.g., Ransome Concrete Machinery Co. v. Moody, 282 F. 29, 36 (2nd Cir. 
1922); Mortgage Corp. v. Manhattan Sav. Bank, 71 N.J. Super. 489, 497, 177 A.2d 326, 
331 (Super. Ct. 1962); Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 
116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
65. See note 1 supra. 
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could be significant if imposed through the standard practice rule 
of contract interpretation. On the other hand, it is possible that  
the use of these requirements will not become sufficiently well 
known, especially among incoming college students, to be im- 
posed on parties by implication. 
Future constitutional requirements on universities in their 
relationships with students could similarly have a broad impact 
on student records  procedure^.^^ Although constitutional pro- 
66. An important, but as yet unanswered question is the extent of constitutional 
protection in the area of student records confidentiality. The United States Supreme 
Court has recognized that the unique setting of the academic community requires appro- 
priately tailored applications of the Constitution. But the Court has only ruled on the 
more pressing campus issues including free speech, due process, and nondiscriminatory 
admission, without addressing the question of a student's constitutional right to privacy. 
See generally Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027 (1969). 
Even outside the university setting, the right of privacy has not been adequately 
defined by the Court. See, e.g., Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. 
L. REV. 219 (1965); Hufstedler, The Directions and Misdirections of a Constitutional Right 
of Privacy, 26 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 546 (1971). The Court's hesitation in this area is a 
reflection of the enormity of the task-privacy, like freedom, is not a unified, self- 
contained concept easy of definition. For example, the right of selective disclosure and the 
right of personal autonomy are both protected by the right to privacy. See note 8 supra. 
The Court has been faulted for discussing the issue of privacy without appropriately 
discriminating between these two distinct concepts. See Comment, Roe and Paris: Does 
Privacy Have a Principle?, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1163-66 (1974). 
Although there were no significant privacy decisions in the Court's first century, the 
nonjudicial writings of the early justices provide evidence that the right to privacy, albeit 
under different appellations, was accepted as an integral aspect of individual dealings; 
both the right of selective disclosure and the right of personal autonomy appear to be 
subsumed in the justices' statements that the guarantees of the various constitutional 
amendments were intended to secure to the individual the rights of "private sentiment, 
private judgment, personal liberty and security." J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTI- 
TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 2 (2d ed. 1851). Although such thinking implied that these 
privacy rights were of constitutional dimensions, invariably a breach of privacy interest 
was remedied by a common law action or, less frequently, by statute. There were no 
attempts to bring an action on constitutional grounds until Boyd v. United States, 116 
U.S. 616 (1886), in the late 19th century. In Boyd, the Supreme Court considered for the 
first time an action based on a claimed governmental breach of the constitutional right 
to privacy and struck down as unconstitutional a customs statute that required a person 
whose goods had been seized as contraband to either produce his business papers in court 
or forfeit the goods. Justice Bradley, writing for the majority, explained that the "privacies 
of life" included not only freedom from physical intrusions, but also "indefeasible 
right[s] of personal security, personal liberty, and private property." Id. a t  630. 
Boyd and succeeding decisions on privacy focused primarily on safeguarding an indi- 
vidual's right of selective disclosure, although the underlying rationale of those cases was 
the protection of one's property interests, not one's personality. As a result, the right to 
individual autonomy received little judicial consideration. Until 1965, judicial 
interpretation alternately expanded and contracted the boundaries of the right to privacy 
without formulating any rational structure for its classification. 
In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Supreme Court assembled suffi- 
cient "emanations" from certain constitutional amendments to provide both a broad 
foundation and a name for a newly expanded constitutional right to privacy. The Connect- 
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hibitions apply only where "state action" is involved," such 
prohibitions could, if they become widely adopted and 
known, be implied into student-university contracts in the 
private university sectorm irrespective of the state action re- 
icut criminal statute a t  issue prohibited the use of contraceptives. By specifically discuss- 
ing the statute's application to married couples, the Court, by implication, necessarily 
coupled the right of personal autonomy with the right of selective disclosure and deter- 
mined that both rights were constitutionally protected. 
The autonomy interest was explicitly expanded following Griswold. While elevating 
a woman's abortion decision to the status of a fundamental privacy right, the Court in 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), clearly showed its determination to broaden the rela- 
tionships and activities that are constitutionally protected. In the process, the penumbral 
theory of Griswold was replaced by the more expansive "concept of personal liberty." 410 
U.S. a t  153-54. In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), the Court recon- 
firmed this extended view of privacy protection by stating that where sufficiently intimate 
relationships exist, the "protected privacy extends to the doctor's office, the hospital, the 
hotel room, or as otherwise required to safeguard the right to intimacy involved. " Id. at  
66 n.13 (emphasis added). 
Through the Griswold, Roe, Paris Theatre line of cases, the Supreme Court has begun 
to clarify which autonomy interests and relationships mandate constitutional scrutiny. At 
the same time, however, the Court has declined several opportunities to confront recent 
threats to selective disclosure, especially those arising outside the context of direct law 
enforcement. In State ex rel. Tarver v. Smith, 78 Wash. 2d 152, 470 P.2d 172 (1970), cert. 
denied, 402 U.S. 1000 (1971), the Court denied certiorari to a welfare recipient who at- 
tempted to challenge allegedly derogatory material that a caseworker had placed in her 
welfare file. In Laird v. Tatum, 408 U S .  1 (1972), plaintiffs who attempted to challenge 
the Army's general surveillance system were denied a hearing on the merits since none of 
the plaintiffs could demonstrate a sufficiently direct injury or threat of injury from the 
surveillance. California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974), involved the require- 
ments of the 1970 Bank Secrecy Act that banking institutions maintain and disclose 
certain financial transactions of their depositors. The Court held that the maintenance 
provisions, as applied, were constitutional, but that any claims by depositors regarding 
disclosure of personal records were premature, speculative, and could not be asserted 
vicariously by the banking association. 
The Supreme Court's lack of an unequivocal constitutional standard should not jus- 
tify a university's neglect to formulate a constitutionally acceptable policy of student 
records confidentiality. The Griswold, Roe, Paris Theatre development implies that a 
court's jurisdiction probably would be triggered by any university records practice that 
failed to protect adequately those personal autonomy areas deemed fundamental rights 
by the Supreme Court. For example, if a student's records contained information regard- 
ing a student's sexual behavior, use of birth control methods, or abortions, these records 
would have to be carefully safeguarded. If not, that student's constitutional right to 
privacy would arguably be violated. 
67. Any application of constitutional rights to students a t  private universities would 
require an extension of the "state action" requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 
Black, Forward: "State Action, " Equal Protection and California's Proposition 14, 81 
HARV. L. REV. 69 passim (1967). To date, actions of universities that are neither funded 
nor operated by a state have been held not to be "state actions." Wahba v. New York 
Univ., 492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1974); Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 
535 (S .D .N.Y. 1968). See also H. FRIENDLY, THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE AND THE PUBLIC- 
PRIVATE PENUMBRA (1971). 
68. See generally Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HAW. L. REV. 
1045, 1143-48 (1968). 
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quirement? Thus, like the standards imposed on universities by 
the Buckley amendment, constitutional prohibitions could be 
implied into student-university contracts to reflect the apparent, 
but unarticulated, intent of the parties with respect to student 
records confidentiality. 
C. Duration of the Student-University Contract 
The student-university contract arises and becomes binding 
a t  the time the student pays his tuition.'O Consequently, contract 
law provides no cause of action for any disclosure of records per- 
taining to a nonmatriculated student .71 The contract terminates 
at  the end of the student's relationship with the university. This 
termination is not necessarily a t  the end of a semester or term for 
which the student has matriculated. Rather, student-university 
contracts have been construed to include an implied option to 
renew as long as reasonable conditions for renewal have been met 
by the student-at least until the student terminates his course 
of Whether or not a contractual responsibility to keep 
69. Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La. 1962). 
See also Wright, The Constitution on Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027 (1969). Professor 
Wright suggests that constitutional standards of conduct could be applied to all colleges 
and universities, whether or not they come within the state action requirement of the 
Fourteenth Amendment: 
Historically private colleges and universities have allowed more freedom to their 
students than has been true a t  public institutions, and, in the turbulent 
atmosphere on today's campuses, it seems to me unthinkable that the faculty 
and administration of any private institution would consider recognizing fewer 
rights in their students than the minimum the Constitution exacts of the state 
universities . . . . 
Id. a t  1035-36; cf. McKay, The Student as Private Citizen, 45 DENVER L.J. 558 (1968). 
70. Silver v. Queens College of City Univ., 63 Misc. 2d 186,311 N .Y .S.2d 313 (N.Y .C. 
Civ. Ct. Queens County 1970). Plaintiff student sued to recover an alleged overcharge of 
tuition. The defendant had raised the tuition rate after registration and had charged 
plaintiff the difference. The court held for the student and granted the refund. 
The parties to the contract are, of course, the student and the institution. If the 
student is minor and dependent, then his parents may be considered parties to the con- 
tract. See, e.g., Jones v. Vassar College, 59 Misc. 2d 296, 299 N.Y.S.2d 283 (Sup. Ct. 
Dutchess County 1969); cf .  Eden v. Board of Trustees of State Univ., 374 N.Y.S.2d 686 
(2d Dep't 1975) (contract arises when letter of acceptance is received by student). 
71. The Buckley amendment protects "student" records, and defines "student" as: 
[Alny person with respect to whom an educational . . . institution maintains 
education records or personally identifiable information, but does not include a 
person who has not been in attendance a t  such . . . institution. 
20 U.S.C. 8 1232g(a)(6) (Supp. IV, 1974). 
72. Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College, 156 Mich. 95, 120 N.W. 589 (1909). 
Solely because they were Black, plaintiffs were not allowed to register for their second year 
after satisfactorily completing their first year. The court held against the college and 
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student records confidential is imposed on a university even after 
the student graduates is not clear. Arguably, since student re- 
cords continue to remain a sensitive matter after graduation, 
courts should imply the contractual term to extend as long as the 
student lives. 
D. Contractual Waiver of University Liability 
Faced with potential liability for misuse of its students' re- 
cords, a university may look to a contractual waiver for protec- 
tion. While a carefully drawn waiver may diminish a university's 
liability, several important legal theories may limit the effective- 
ness of such a waiver. 
Consent has historically been a defense to most torts.73 Nev- 
ertheless, a contractual waiver of tortious liability will be held 
invalid if the waiver is found to be uncon~cionable.~~ Courts have 
held commercial contracts containing waivers of tort liability 
unenforceable where the waiver is against public policy and 
where a large disparity in bargaining power exists between the 
parties to a contract.75 In the student-university context, how- 
ever, the courts have been hesitant to limit a university's power 
to contract with the student on any terms agreed upon, however 
unreasonable : 
There is nothing inherently illegal in the setting.by a private, 
or even a public, institution of higher learning of conditions 
upon which it will accept a candidate for a degree. Even if the 
stipulation made as a condition is regarded as unreasonable or 
oppressive, the contract made by the parties must govern in the 
absence of fraud or mistake.76 
A second limitation on the validity of a contractual waiver 
of liability is imposed if it purports to legitimize a violation of a 
reinstated the students on the ground that there was an implied understanding that the 
students would not be arbitrarily dismissed before receiving their diplomas. 
73. See Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind. App. 643, 86 N.E.2d 306 (1949); 
Johnson v. Boeing Airplane Co., 175 Kan. 275, 262 P.2d 808 (1953); W. PROSSER, HAND- 
BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 817 (4th ed. 1971). 
74. See, e.g., Fedor v. Mauwehu Council, Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 21 Conn. 
Supp. 38, 143 A.2d 466 (Super. Ct. 1958); 15 S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §§  
1750, 1750A (3d ed. 1972). 
75. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). 
76. Auser v. Cornell Univ., 71 Misc. 2d 1084, 1089, 337 N.Y.S.2d 878, 883 (Sup. Ct. 
Tompkins County 1972). A transfer student from a state university to a private university 
was assessed, pursuant to the terms of a student university contract, a special transfer 
fee. The court admitted serious difficulty in understanding the purpose of the transfer 
charge but found, nonetheless, that the contract was valid and binding. 
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student's constitutional rights. Some commentators have argued 
that a student's constitutional rights are personal rights and, as 
such, may be voluntarily waived by the student.77 Others vigor- 
ously disagree.78 In Dixon u. Alabama State Board of E d u ~ a t i o n , ~ ~  
students had been expelled from Alabama State College for al- 
leged misconduct. When the expulsion was challenged for a de- 
nial of the students' due process rights, the college argued that 
the students had contractually waived their due process rights 
upon admission. The court found that even if the alleged contrac- 
tual waiver had been properly understood by the students, it was 
ineffective-they could not forfeit their fundamental rights: 
We do not read this [Board of Education] provision to clearly 
indicate an intent on the part of the student to waive notice and 
a hearing before expulsion. If, however, we should so assume, i t  
nonetheless remains true that the State cannot condition the 
granting of even a privilege upon the renunciation of the consti- 
tutional right to procedural due process.80 
Thus, i t  appears that a student cannot waive whatever constitu- 
tional right to privacy he may have with respect to student re- 
c o r d ~ . ~ '  
The contract doctrine that promises are unenforceable ab- 
sent consideration imposes another restriction on the use by uni- 
versities of contractual waivers. Since a contractual consent or 
waiver given gratuitously is not enforceable," it becomes impor- 
tant to determine whether or not the promise was supported by 
consideration. If a waiver is signed or a records policy is published 
after the payment of tuition, the waiver's efficacy is question- 
able.83 On the other hand, consent obtained for consideration is 
usually enf~rceab le .~~  
Contractual waivers, then, can effectively limit a univer- 
sity's liability for improper use of student records to the extent 
77. See Caruso, Privacy of Students and Confidentiality of Student Records, 22 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 379, 380-81 (1971). 
78. See Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045,1136- 
37 (1968). See generally Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1595 (1960). 
79. 294 F.2d 150, 156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961). 
80. 294 F.2d a t  156. 
81. See note 66 supra. 
82. Garden v. Parfumerie Rigaud, Inc., 151 Misc. 692, 271 N.Y.S. 187 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 
County 1933). 
83. See Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1137 
( 1968). 
84. Lillie v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 139 Cal. App. 724, 34 P.2d 835 (Dist. Ct. 
App. 1934). 
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that they are not unconscionable or against public policy, do not 
attempt to waive a constitutional right, and are supported by 
consideration. 
Despite the Buckley amendment's protections for student 
records, substantial areas of probable dispute remain. A reasoned 
application of the common law remains a flexible and sure vehicle 
for the resolution of these disputes. By rational invocation of 
analogy and precedent, the common law principles of tort, the 
"right to know," and contract can provide extensive protection 
for and an adequate balancing of both student and university 
interests. 
